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PRODUCT EXPANSION IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY: AN
ANALYSIS AND REVISION OF SECTION 4(c)(8) OF
THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT
INTRODUCTION
A major restructuring of the financial services industry is occurring' as
1. For example, some life insurance companies have merged with securities broker-
age firms. See, ,,g., E. Bowden & J. Holbert, Revolution in Banking 242 (2d ed. 1984)
(merger of Prudential Life Insurance Company with the Bache brokerage firm); Recent
Insurer-Broker Mergers, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1984, at D4, col. I (listing numerous merg-
ers); Equitable Life Agrees to Buy Donaldson Firm, Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 1984, at 3, col. 1
(brokerage and money management firm purchased by life insurance company). These
and other financial institutions, such as commercial finance companies, have also ac-
quired or created the so-called "nonbanks," institutions that do not meet the statutory
definition of a bank set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(6)(c) (1982): They either accept
deposits or make commercial loans but do not engage in both. See, eg., Decision of the
Comptroller of the Currency to Charter Dreyfus Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., [1982-1983
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 99,464, at 86,607, 86,615 (Feb. 4, 1983)
(mutual fund company allowed to create nonbank); E. Bowden & J. Holbert, supra, at
167-68 (describing growth of nonbank banks); Household Finance Parent to Enter Bank-
ing Business by Acquisition, Am. Banker, July 13, 1981, at 1, col. 3 (acquisition of Valley
National Bank by consumer finance firm on condition that Valley spin off its commercial
loan portfolio and cease to be a "bank"). The acquisition of nonbanks is desirable be-
cause those institutions are not subject to the regulatory restrictions imposed on banks.
Lobell, Nonbank Banks: Controversy Over a New Form of Consumer Bank, 39 Bus. Law.
1193, 1194-96 (1984). Nonfinancial firms, such as General Electric, Sears Roebuck, J.C.
Penney, and Parker Pen Company, have also entered the financial services market. See
Competitive Equity in the Financial Services Industry: Hearings on . 2181, 2134 Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 426
(1984) (table illustrating the financial subsidiaries of conglomerates) [hereinafter cited as
1984 Hearings]; House Comm. on Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., Financial Institutions in a Revolutionary Era 1-2 (Comm. Print 1981) (describing
recent conglomerations); E. Bowden & J. Holbert, supra, at 16, 167 (describing the types
of firms that own nonbanks); Realty Firm Plans Financial Services--Century 21 Sets Net-
workfor Loans, Insurance, Partnerships, Am. Banker, Jan. 14, 1983, at 1, col. 1 (threefold
diversification of real estate firm into mortgage brokerage, real estate syndication, and
property insurance); Sears Opens First In-Store Financial Centers Today, Am. Banker,
July 19, 1982, at 3, col. 1 (savings and loan association incorporated into financial serv-
ices center); Parker Pen Affiliate Buys Small New Hampshire Bank-Move into Financial
Services Field Follows Lead of Other Nonbanking Companies, Am. Banker, Oct. 30, 1981,
at 3, col. 2 (describing acquisition of nonbank by affiliate of writing instrument manufac-
turer).
Congress is attempting to close the nonbank loophole by redefining "bank" more re-
strictively. See H.R. 15, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(a) (1985) (suggesting definition of
bank as any institution that utilizes borrowing, discount or payment system services pro-
vided by the Federal Reserve System). This loophole recently has been challenged in the
judicial arena. See Florida Dept. of Banking and Fin. v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res.
Sys., 760 F.2d 1135, 1138-44 (11th Cir. 1985) (literal definition of "bank" should not be
applied to reach a result contrary to the underlying policy of Congress). If these attempts
are ultimately successful, it would merely preclude the acquiring institutions from utiliz-
ing the nonbank route to expand their range of financial services. Financial institutions
can and do diversify in other ways. See E. Bowden & J. Holbert, supra, at 243-44. In-
deed, the present restructuring and diversification of the financial services industry has
been referred to as an "homogenization" of institutions. American Bankers' Ass'n Ad
Hoc Comm. on Developments in Investment Services, Homogenization of Financial Insti-
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depository2 and nondepository3 institutions vigorously compete with one
another in a variety of fields.4 This competition, resulting from eco-
tutions: The Legislative and Regulatory Response, 38 Bus. Law. 241, 241-43, 247 (1982)
(remarks of Kenneth J. Bialkin, Meyer Eisenberg and Ralph Ferrara).
2. The phrase "depository institutions" refers to financial organizations, such as
commercial banks, savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and credit un-
ions, that hold liabilities in the form of deposits or shares and assets in the form of loans
and investments. See S. Rep. No. 487, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-4 (1975). Commercial
banks are those banks that originally concentrated on providing financial services, such as
short-term loans, to businesses. K. Cooper & D. Fraser, Banking Deregulation and the
New Competition in Financial Services 9-10 (1984). Today, however, commercial banks
do make consumer and mortgage loans and encourage savings deposits by individuals.
See id. at 11-14. Nonbank depository institutions are the savings and loan associations,
mutual savings banks, and credit unions, collectively referred to as "thrift institutions."
C. Golembe & D. Holland, Federal Regulation of Banking 1983-84, at 9 (1983). Mutual
savings banks and savings and loan associations were originally formed to provide credit
for the purchase of homes. K. Cooper & D. Fraser, supra, at 10; see C. Golembe & D.
Holland, supra, at 9. Mutual savings banks differ from savings and loan associations in
that the former's depositors are considered to be creditors of the bank and, hence, in
theory, "have a higher legal standing than if they were considered mere shareholders."
C. Golembe & D. Holland, supra, at 183. "In view of the pervasiveness of deposit insur-
ance, however, the distinctions probably have little practical significance." Id. at 186.
Credit unions were originally designed to provide small, often unsecured, personal loans
to consumers. K. Cooper & D. Fraser, supra, at 10. All of these institutions are
chartered by either the federal or state government. See C. Golembe & D. Holland,
supra, at 182, 185-88. For a general discussion of the dual nature of the American bank-
ing system, see Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation,
in Issues in Financial Regulation 1, 3-8 (F. Edwards ed. 1979).
The powers of these depository institutions have been recently expanded. See Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, §§ 325, 327, 96 Stat. 1469,
1500, 1501 (1982) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(c)(1)(R), 3503(c) (1982)) (authorizing
thrift institutions to make secured and unsecured commercial loans and to offer money
market deposit accounts) [hereinafter the Garn-St. Germain Act]; Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 401, 94
Stat. 132, 151-55 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1982)) (authorizing federally chartered
savings and loan associations to make commercial real estate and other loans).
3. Nondepository institutions competing with commercial banks include both finan-
cial firms, such as insurance companies, securities brokerage firms, mutual fund compa-
nies and consumer finance companies, and nonfinancial firms, such as retailers and
manufacturers. See E. Bowden & J. Holbert, supra note 1, at 231.
4. Although commercial banks are the major supplier of credit in our economy,
their share of total short-term, nonfinancial debt decreased from 69.8% in 1970 to 59.1%
in 1980, reflecting competition with commercial finance companies and the commercial
paper market. Golembe Associates, Inc., Product Expansion by Bank Holding Compa-
nies: An Assessment of Present and Future Policy Considerations 44 (Jan. 1982) (discus-
sion paper prepared for the Association of Bank Holding Companies) (available in files of
Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Product Expansion]; see also Stevens, The
Intersection of the Banking and Securities Industries and Future Deregulation, in The
Deregulation of the Banking and Securities Industries 295, 295-96 (L. Goldberg & L.
White eds. 1979) (foreign banks, the commercial paper market and finance companies are
lending money to businesses at an increasing rate). Banks also face significant competi-
tion in the area of consumer lending, primarily from finance companies. See Rosenblum,
Siegel & Pavel, Banks and Nonbanks: A Run for the Money, Econ. Persps., May/June
1983, 3, 5-6. Finally, money market mutual funds can offer higher rates because they do
not have to keep a certain percentage of their customers' money as "reserves." See K.
Cooper & D. Fraser, supra note 2, at 7-8. Commercial banks are thus no longer the sole
provider of checking account services. Compare Bank Holding Company Act Amend-
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nomic,5 technological6 and demographic changes,7 is desirable because it
provides consumers with a broad range of financial services characterized
by high returns, liquidity and convenience.' At the same time, however,
this competition is challenging the long-established policy of separating
banking from commerce. 9
ments: Hearings on H.R. 6778 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 638 (1969) (statement of Prof. William G. Dewald, Department of Eco-
nomics, Ohio State University) ("The money business including demand deposits can be
interpreted as a cartel ... which includes every commercial bank.") [hereinafter cited as
1969 Hearings] with Product Expansion, supra, at 45 ("all kinds of depository institutions
and many non-depository institutions are offering transaction account services"); see also
1984 Hearings, supra note 1, at 427 (table comparing the retail financial services offered
by various institutions). Competition in all of the above areas is increasing as the thrift
institutions exercise newly granted powers. See K. Cooper & D. Fraser, supra note 2, at
15; C. Golembe & D. Holland, supra note 2, at 181-82. See supra note 2 and accompany-
ing text.
5. High market rates of interest have made the yields of unregulated money market
mutual funds competitive with regulated bank savings instruments. See Competition and
Conditions in the Financial System. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1981) (statement of John G. Heimann,
Comptroller of the Currency) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Senate Hearings]; K. Cooper &
D. Fraser, supra note 2, at 8; see also E. Bowden & J. Holbert, supra note 1, at 112 (high
interest rates brought about growth of money market mutual funds). Inflation and high
interest rates sensitized consumers to financial change and new financial products. See E.
Bowden & J. Holbert, supra, at 112; see also Greenbaum & Higgins, Financial Innovation,
in Financial Services: The Changing Institutions and Government Policy 213, 233 (G.
Benston ed. 1983) ("high interest rates dictate a diversion of real resources to financial
management").
6. Computer technology has made possible the quick and low cost transfer of funds
from one asset and institution to another. See Financial Institutions in a Revolutionary
Era.: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 45-49 (1981) (statement of Almarin Phillips, Professor of Economics,
Law and Public Policy, University of Pennsylvania) (technology has reduced the cost of
exchanging assets); E. Bowden & J. Holbert, supra note 1, at 193-207 (discussing develop-
ment of electronic banking). Technology also permits economies of scale and of scope--
economies of joint production. See K. Cooper & D. Fraser, supra note 2, at 194. In
addition, reduced data processing costs have made possible the issuance of small-savers'
debt instruments by both financial and nonfinancial institutions. Id at 193.
7. See 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 72 (statement of John G. Heimann,
Comptroller of the Currency) (migration from northern and eastern sections of the coun-
try to southern and western sections has stimulated the development of financial prod-
ucts); Heimann, Forces for Change in Banking, in 1 Ann. Rev. of Banking L. 53, 54
(1982) (same).
8. See E. Bowden & J. Holbert, supra note 1, at 227-29 (financial institutions hope to
attract savers by offering various combinations of financial instruments); Walliston, The
Emerging Regulatory Structure for Banks. Implications for the Insurance Industry, in The
Emerging Financial Industry 73, 73 (A. Sametz ed. 1984) ("competition improve[s] the
services offered to consumers"). One example of a financial service that has benefited the
consumer is the "asset management account," which offers money market interest rates,
check-writing privileges, and a line of credit accessible by credit card. E. Bowden & J.
Holbert, supra, at 237-38.
9. The National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12, 19 & 31 U.S.C.), restricts national banks to "carry[ing] on the
business of banking." See 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh (1982). It also restricts the holding of
real estate, see id § 29, and prohibits loans of more than 10% of the bank's capital and
surplus to any individual, partnership or corporation, see id. § 84. The Banking Act of
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A major form of banking organization in America is the bank holding
company,1" which is a corporation that controls one or more banks."
These companies, however, are restricted from meeting the competitive
challenges of the marketplace by an outmoded regulatory structure.
12
Under section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act (Act),' 3 bank
holding companies may engage in certain nonbank activities that the
Federal Reserve Board-the agency responsible for the regulation of
bank holding companies 4-- has determined to be "so closely related to
banking . as to be a proper incident thereto."' 5 Under the "closely
1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), popu-
larly known as the Glass-Steagall Act, divorced the commercial banking industry from
the securities industry. Finally, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-
511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982)), restricts bank
holding companies to activities "closely related to banking." Id. § 1843(c)(8). See Sy-
mons, The "Business of Banking" in Historical Perspective, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 676,
680-81 (1983) (defining the business of banking as deposit-taking, credit-granting and
credit exchange).
10. See H. Hutchinson, Money, Banking, and the United States Economy 86 (1984)
(bank holding companies control about 75% of all commercial bank assets); Savage, De-
velopments in Banking Structure 1970-81, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 77, 81-82 (1982) (same).
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1982). A bank holding company is deemed to have con-
trol over a bank when it has the power to vote 25% or more of any class of voting
securities of the bank, elect or influence the election of directors or trustees of the bank,
or when the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System determines that it exer-
cises a controlling influence over the management or policies of the bank. ld.
§ 1841(a)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(d) (1985).
12. See Gorinson & Manishin, Garn-St. Germain: A Harbinger of Change, 40 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 1313, 1335 (1983) ("Regulatory attempts to compartmentalize institutions
and to structure competition along prescribed lines create perverse incentives and
straightjacket the ability of the regulated firms to respond to market changes.") (footnote
omitted). See infra Pt. I.C. Although nondepository firms are free to compete with bank
holding companies by engaging in a wide range of financial services, bank holding compa-
nies may not underwrite securities, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 Seventh, 377-378 (1982), or certain
kinds of insurance, id. §1843(c)(8). See 1984 Hearings, supra note 1, at 418, 424 (testi-
mony of the Consumer Bankers Ass'n).
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
14. Id. § 1844(b). National banks are regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency;
federally chartered savings and loan associations and savings banks are supervised by the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board. C. Golembe & D. Holland, supra note 2, at 16, 18.
National and state banks may insure their deposits through the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation; federally chartered thrift institutions look to the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation. Id.
15. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982). Section 4(c)(8) formulates the following test:
The prohibitions in this section [concerning nonbanking activities] shall not ap-
ply to. . .(8) shares of any company the activities of which the Board after due
notice and opportunity for hearing has determined (by order or regulation) to
be so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a
proper incident thereto, but for purposes of this subsection it is not closely re-
lated to banking or managing or controlling banks for a bank holding company
to provide insurance as a principal, agent, or broker except [in certain limited
circumstances]. . . . In determining whether a particular activity is a proper
incident to banking or managing or controlling banks the Board shall consider
whether its performance by an affiliate of a holding company can reasonably be
expected to produce benefits to the public, such as greater convenience, in-
creased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse ef-
1130 [Vol. 53
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related" language, the Board regards past or present operations and func-
tions of banks in general as a limitation on what bank holding companies
may do in the future.16 In determining what is a "proper incident" to
banking, the Board is directed to consider whether the applicant's con-
duct of the proposed activity will produce "benefits to the public, such as
greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that
outweigh possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration of re-
sources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interests, or un-
sound banking practices."'17 This is known as the "public benefits" test. 8
There are several reasons for reexamining the viability of the present
section 4(c)(8). First, there is the desire to promote competition in the
rapidly changing financial services industry.19 Second, diversification
can provide a bank holding company with new sources of income that
could be used, to a certain extent, to stabilize earnings.20 Finally, liberal-
ization of section 4(c)(8) would be consistent with the recent trend to-
fects, such as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair
competition, conflicts of interests, or unsound banking practices. In orders and
regulations under this subsection, the Board may differentiate between activities
commenced de novo and activities commenced by the acquisition, in whole or
in part, of a going concern.
Id Board determinations under § 4(c)(8) are reviewable in the Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals. Id § 1848.
16. See, e.g., Seaflrst Corp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 318, 318-19 (1982) (underwriting
group mortgage life insurance is not operationally or functionally similar to bank activi-
ties); BankAmerica Corp., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 660, 661 (1980) (same with respect to un-
derwriting home loan life mortgage insurance). See infra Pt. I.A.1.
17. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
18. See Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 736 F.2d
468, 471 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing Connecticut Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Govs. of the Fed.
Res. Sys., 627 F.2d 245, 249-50 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of
Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 658 F.2d 571, 573 (8th Cir. 1981); M. Jessee & S. Seelig,
Bank Holding Companies and the Public Interest 30-31 (1977). The public benefits test
has also been referred to as the "proper incident" test. See Association of Bank Travel
Bureaus v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 568 F.2d 549, 551 (7th Cir. 1978); C.
Golembe & D. Holland, supra note 2, at 155.
19. See 1984 Hearings, supra note 1, at 423-25 (testimony of the Consumer Bankers
Ass'n); K. Cooper & D. Fraser, supra note 2, at 18-19. See supra note 8 and accompany-
ing text.
20. See Heggestad, Riskiness of Investments in Nonbank Activities by Bank Holding
Companies, 27 J. Econ. & Bus. 219, 222 (1975); Note, Restrictions on Bank Underwriting
of Corporate Securitier A Proposal for More Permissive Regulation, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 720,
720, 729 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Bank Underwriting]; see also Edwards & Scott, Reg-
ulating the Solvency of Depository Institutions: A Perspective for Deregulation, in Issues in
Financial Regulation 65, 93 (F. Edwards ed. 1979) ("there is actually good reason to
think that, as a diversification constraint, [activity limitations] make banks more vulnera-
ble to insolvency"). See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
Financial diversification and deregulation is occurring in other free world countries.
K. Cooper & D. Fraser, supra note 2, at 75-90 (comparing financial systems of West
European nations, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan). "Most Western nations,
even though their individual banking structures all display unique characteristics, are
exhibiting strong tendencies to unfetter their financial systems and allow competition to
play a greater role." Id at 102.
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ward banking deregulation.21
This Note argues that the regulatory separation of banking from com-
merce-which furthers the goals of ensuring bank safety and soundness,
avoiding conflicts of interest, and preventing undue concentration of re-
sources-should be maintained but adjusted through revision of section
4(c)(8). After describing the requirements of section 4(c)(8), Part I of
this Note reviews the significant legislative and regulatory liberalizations
that have taken place since the original section 4(c)(8) was passed and
concludes that the statutory standard still restricts the ability of bank
holding companies to compete in the financial services marketplace. Part
II formulates a "reasonably related to banking" standard that looks not
at the operations of banks, but at whether the proposed activity is finan-
cial in nature and consistent with bank safety and soundness and the
avoidance of conflicts of interest. The financial activity limitation and a
separate competitive criterion are included in the proposed scheme in
order to address, in part, antitrust concerns and to ensure competition in
the financial services industry.
I. SECTION 4(c)(8) OF THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1956
A. Statutory Interpretation
Section 4(a) of the Act prohibits bank holding companies from engag-
ing in nonbanking activities.22 Section 4(c) enumerates exceptions to this
rule.23 Section 4(c)(8) has the most important and controversial implica-
21. See Garn-St. Germain Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, §§ 320-321, 96 Stat. 1469, 1499-
1502 (1982) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(c), 3503 (1982)) (authorizing new and ex-
panded powers for depository institutions); Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-290, § 203, 96 Stat. 1233, 1236 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14) (1982))
(authorizing bank holding companies to invest up to five percent of their consolidated
surplus and capital in export trading companies); Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 201-204, 303, 401-403, 408, 94 Stat.
132, 142-43, 146, 151-58, 160 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464, 1832(a), 3501-3503 (1982))
(elimination of interest rate controls and expansion of powers of savings institutions);
Gorinson & Manishin, supra note 12, at 1345-46 ("Although not comprehensive and not
perfect, the [Garn-St. Germain] Act dramatically continues the process of regulatory re-
form of the financial services industry begun in 1980."); Holloway, What Banks Should
Know About Export Trading Companies, 166 Bankers' Mag. 82, 87 (1983) ("The Export
Trading Company Act represents for banks a significant departure from the long-stand-
ing rule that banks must separate banking from commerce.").
22. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1982). Section 4(a) reads in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, no bank holding company shall-
(1) ...acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of
any company which is not a bank or...
(2) ...retain direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of
any company which is not a bank. ...
Id.
23. These exceptions include, inter alia, holding property used by any banking subsid-
iaries of the bank holding company, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(1)(A) (1982), conducting a safe
deposit business, id. § 1843(c)(1)(B), providing services to the bank holding company or
its banking subsidiaries, id. § 1843(c)(1)(C), owning shares of any company provided
such ownership does not include more than five percent of the outstanding voting shares
[Vol. 531132
PRODUCT EXPANSION IN BANKING
tions for bank product expansion.24 It contains a two pronged test:25
First, is the activity closely related to banking?;2 6 second, do the public
benefits outweigh any adverse effects?2 7 If the Board determines that an
activity is not closely related to banking, it need not consider the public
benefits test.28
1. The Closely Related Test
When the Act was passed in 1956, Congress did not specify the criteria
to be used in determining what is "closely related" to the business of
banking.29 Nor did it do so in 1970 when it amended the statute by
deleting the phrase "business of."3 Hence, the issue was ripe for judicial
of such company, id. § 1843(c)(6), owning shares of foreign companies that conduct most
of their business outside the United States, provided such ownership is not substantially
at variance with the purposes of section 4(a) and is in the public interest, id. § 1843(c)(9),
and owning shares of export trading companies provided that such ownership has not
been disapproved by the Board and that the investment, whether direct or indirect, in
such shares does not exceed five percent of the bank holding company's consolidated
capital and surplus, id. § 1843(c)(14). Section 4(c)(6) has been interpreted by the Board
to allow for only passive investments amounting to not more than five percent of a com-
pany's outstanding stock; that is, two or more bank holding companies may not pool
their shares under section 4(c)(6) in order to gain control of a company. 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.137(d)(2) (1985). If the Board determines that authority to engage in a particular
nonbank activity can be found in one of the other 4(c) exceptions as well as under section
4(c)(8), it may elect to treat that activity under the other exception. See 46 Fed. Reg.
38,493, 38,494 (1981) (authority under section 4(c)(8) for bank holding companies to sell
certain kinds of insurance removed to the servicing exceptions, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(a)(2)(A), (c)(1)(C) (1982)).
24. See C. Golembe & D. Holland, supra note 2, at 154; Chase, The Emerging Finan-
cial Conglomerate Liberalization of the Bank Holding Company Act, 60 Geo. UJ. 1225,
1237 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Chase I]; Kohn & Zoellner, The Amended Bank Holding
Company Act, Fed. Res. Bank of Kansas City Monthly Rev. 11, 15 (1971).
25. In Association of Bank Travel Bureaus v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys.,
568 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1978), the plaintiff association contended that section 4(c)(8) con-
tained not a two-tiered test, but a single test, so that the Board would have to consider the
benefits resulting from a particular activity in evaluating any application. Id. at 551. The
court, however, rejected this interpretation. See iL at 551 n.3, 552; see also Securities
Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 104 S. Ct. 3003, 3006 (1984) (two-
tiered test); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res.
Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 688 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same); Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v.
Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 533 F.2d 224, 235, 245-47 (5th Cir. 1976) (same),
modified on other groundsper curiam, 558 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
904 (1978).
26. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
28. See BankAmerica Corp. v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 491 F.2d 985,
988 (9th Cir. 1974).
29. See National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 516 F.2d
1229, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("the quoted phrase [closely related to the business of bank-
ing'] was never elucidated [by Congress]"); S. Rep. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13
(1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2482, 2494 (giving examples of
what is closely related to banking but not specifying criteria) [hereinafter cited as 1955
Senate Report].
30. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14, 19-21, reprinted in
1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5519, 5563-65, 5571-72 (closely related standard
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interpretation. In National Courier Association v. Board of Governors,3
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated that the
following criteria were relevant in deciding whether an activity is closely
related to banking:
1. Banks generally have in fact provided the proposed services.
2. Banks generally provide services that are operationally or func-
tionally so similar to the proposed services as to equip them partic-
ularly well to provide the proposed service.
3. Banks generally provide services that are so integrally related to
the proposed services as to require their provision in a specialized
form.
3 2
The National Courier court did not intend the above criteria to be deter-
minative but gave "considerable deference" to the Board to refine the
guidelines "in a reasoned fashion consistent with the legislative intent. '33
retained but not explained) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Conference Report]. See infra note
48.
31. 516 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
32. Id. at 1237.
33. Id. The Board has stated that it will consider "in addition to the National Courier
criteria, any other factor that an applicant may advance to demonstrate a reasonable or
close connection or relationship of the activity to banking." 49 Fed. Reg. 806 (1984).
Under the rubric of "deference to the Board," courts have been able to apply the Na-
tional Courier criteria liberally. For example, in Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs. v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the court
deferred to the Board's determination that the provision of specialized computer hard-
ware by a bank holding company came within the third National Courier guideline, Id. at
694, and stated:
The record of the present proceeding displays a careful and conscientious effort
by the Board to cope with these difficulties [of interpretation]. We are not in-
clined to complicate its task further by attempting to exercise close and neces-
sarily inexpert supervision of its judgments. That would be particularly
inappropriate under a governing statute such as this one, which commits it to
the Board to apply a standard of such inherent imprecision . . . that a discre-
tion of almost legislative scope was necessarily contemplated. If there is a prob-
lem in such broad delegation, it would assuredly not be solved by effectively
taking the delegation from the Board and placing it in our own hands. Having
assured ourselves that the Board has acted reasonably, consistently and with
procedural regularity in giving content to the statutory standard, our task is at
an end.
Id. at 697; see also Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 104 S.
Ct. 3003, 3009 (1984) ("[T]he Board has articulated with commendable thoroughness the
ways in which banking activities are similar to the [discount] brokerage activities at issue
here."); Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 78(1981) (Whether bank holding companies may act as investment adviser to closed-end
investment companies is a decision that is "best resolved by deferring to the Board's
expertise in determining what activities are encompassed within the plain language of the
statute.").
The justifications for this deference were discussed by Justice Rutledge in his concur-
rence in Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947) (challenge
under the Glass-Steagall Act):
[n]ot only because Congress has committed the system's operation to [the
Board's] hands, but also because the system itself is a highly specialized and
technical one, requiring expert and coordinated management in all its phases
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The Supreme Court has approved the National Courier guidelines.3
... . Their specialized experience gives them an advantage judges cannot pos-
sibly have, not only in dealing with the problems raised for their discretion by
the system's working, but also in ascertaining the meaning Congress had in
mind in prescribing the standards by which they should administer it. Accord-
ingly their judgment in such matters should be overturned only where there is
no reasonable basis to sustain it or where they exercise it in a manner which
clearly exceeds their statutory authority.
Id at 450 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
34. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 104 S. Ct.
3003, 3009 (1984) (stating that the standard was "reasonable and supported by a normal
reading of the statutory language of § 4(c)(8)"). Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1985),
lists, inter alia, the activities that have been determined by the Board to be closely related
to banking, M. Jessee & S. Seelig, supra note 18, at 33-34; see Comment, Implementation
of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970: The Scope of Banking Activiides,
71 Mich. L. Rev. 1170, 1188-89, 1189 n.140 (1973), and whose general conduct can result
in public benefits, see Connecticut Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys.,
627 F.2d 245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Implicit in Regulation Y is the Board's reasoned
determination that the permissible activities. . . can generally be expected to achieve net
public benefits."). But see Security Pacific Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 118, 121 (1985)
(general conduct of credit rating business by a bank holding company would result in
pervasive conflicts of interest outweighing any possible public benefits); D.H. Baldwin &
Co., 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 280, 285 (1977) (acquisition of savings and loan association by
bank holding company would interfere with the separate congressionally mandated regu-
latory structure governing such institutions and thus not result in net public benefits).
This list of nonbanking activities is deceptive in that most of the activities are not really
"nonbank"-that is, banks themselves may engage directly in these activities by relying
on specific statutory authority, see C. Golembe & D. Holland, supra note 2, at 156-57; see
also J. Norton & S. Whitley, Banking Law Manual § 4.08 (Cum. Supp. Mar. 1984) (com-
parative chart of bank powers); Eisenbeis, Bank Holding Companies and Public Policy, in
Financial Services: The Changing Institutions and Government Policy 127, 138-39 (G.
Benston ed. 1983) (table indicating which section 4(c)(8) activities are permissible to na-
tional banks), or the "incidental powers" clause of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24
Seventh (1982). See Product Expansion, supra note 4, at 38, 42.
Regulation Y lists, inter alia, the following activities as closely related to banking: (1)
making and servicing loans or extending credit such as would be made by a mortgage,
finance, credit card, or factoring company; (2) performing trust or fiduciary activities; (3)
acting as investment or financial adviser to the extent of (i) serving as advisory company
to a mortgage or real estate investment trust, (ii) serving as investment adviser to mutual
funds, including sponsoring, organizing and managing a closed-end investment company,
(iii) providing portfolio investment advice to other persons, (iv) furnishing general eco-
nomic information and advice, general statistical forecasting services, and industry stud-
ies, and (v) providing financial advice to state and local governments; (4) leasing personal
and real property provided the transaction is the functional equivalent of an extension of
credit; (5) making equity and debt investments in community development corporations
or projects designed to promote community welfare or rehabilitation; (6) furnishing cer-
tain data processing and transmission services, data bases or facilities provided the data
to be processed is financial, banking or economic; (7) acting as insurance agent or broker,
except as prohibited by Title VI of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of
1982, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982), see infra note 62 and accompanying text, in offices at
which the bank holding company or its subsidiaries are otherwise engaged in business, or
in an office adjacent thereto, with respect to insurance that is directly related to certain
extensions of credit or to provision of other financial services by a bank or a bank-related
firm, and any insurance sold in a community that has a population not exceeding 5000
residents; (8) underwriting credit life, accident and health insurance that is directly re-
lated to an extension of credit by the bank holding company system; (9) providing courier
services for financially related documents, instruments, and audit and accounting media;
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2. The Public Benefits Test
Under the public benefits test, the Board examines a proposed activity
(10) providing management consulting to nonaffiliated bank and nonbank depository in-
stitutions; (11) performing real estate appraisals; (12) offering discount brokerage services
and certain margin lending activities; (13) arranging commercial real estate equity financ-
ing; (14) underwriting and dealing in government obligations and money market instru-
ments; (15) providing foreign exchange advisory and transactional services; and (16)
acting as a futures commission merchant. 12 C.F.R. § 225.25 (1985).
The Board may also approve "any incidental activities that are necessary to carry on"
activities determined to be closely related to banking. 12 C.F.R. § 225.21(a)(2) (1985);
see Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys.,
745 F.2d 677, 694-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (provision of computer hardware in conjunction
with banking, financial or economic data software held incidental to data processing);
Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 533 F.2d 224, 242-
45 (5th Cir. 1976) (liability insurance held incidental to providing property damage insur-
ance for the collateral in bank loans), modified on other grounds per curiam, 558 F.2d 729
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978). But see National Courier Ass'n v.
Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 516 F.2d 1229, 1240-41 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (courier
services that were not financially related and that were provided as a matter of conven-
ience to customer held not incidental to financially related courier services).
In addition to the activities listed in Regulation Y, the Board has authority to issue
specific orders approving additional activities, see 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982), such as
buying and selling gold and silver bullion, see JCT Trust Co., 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 635, 635,
637 (1981), and providing personal financial management courses, Citicorp, 65 Fed. Res.
Bull. 265, 265 (1979). Approval by order allows the Board to consider applications to
engage in activites not listed in Regulation Y. C. Golembe & D. Holland, supra note 2, at
155-56.
The Board has determined the following activities to be impermissible under section
4(c)(8): (I) insurance premium funding-the financing of sales of mutual fund shares and
life insurance as a package, 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 905, 905 (1972); 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 571,
571 (1972); (2) underwriting life insurance generally, 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 905 (1972), group
mortgage life insurance, Seafirst Corp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 318, 319 (1982), mortgage
guaranty insurance, 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 727, 728 (1974); 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 681, 681
(1974), home loan life mortgage insurance, BankAmerica Corp., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 660,
661-62 (1980), and property and casualty insurance, NCNB Corp., 64 Fed. Res. Bull.
506, 507 (1978), af'd sub nom., NCNB Corp. v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 599
F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979); (3) operating a savings and loan association, see D.H. Baldwin
Co., 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 280, 287 (1977), except in certain limited circumstances, see Cit-
icorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 656, 657-59 (1982) (approving bank holding company acquisi-
tion of failing savings and loan association); (4) providing contract key entry services,
Orbanco, Inc., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 666, 667-68 (1980); (5) real estate syndication, 58 Fed.
Res. Bull. 905, 905 (1972), development, Central Pacific Corp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 382,
383 (1982); 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 905, 905 (1972); U.B. Financial Corp., 58 Fed. Res. Bull.
428, 429 (1972), and brokerage, Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 427, 428
(1972); (6) general management consulting, see 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 905, 905 (1972); First
Commerce Corp., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 674, 676 (1972); (7) property management services
not connected with bank holding company operations, see United Missouri Bancshares,
Inc., 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 415, 417 (1978); 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 905, 905 (1972); 58 Fed. Res.
Bull. 652, 652 (1972); (8) operating a travel agency, 62 Fed. Res. Bull. 148, 148-49
(1976); see also Association of Bank Travel Bureaus v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res.
Sys., 568 F.2d 549, 552-53 (7th Cir. 1978) (upholding Board's determination that provid-
ing travel services is not closely related to banking); and (9) dealing in certain commodi-
ties, see Board Order, Oct. 4, 1973, re Standard & Chartered Banking Group, Ltd., 38
Fed. Reg. 27,552, 27,553 (1973) (platinum and palladium).
The Federal Reserve Board has recently voted to seek public comment on whether
bank holding companies should be permitted to engage in real estate development actvi-
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to see if it will result in any adverse effects, such as undue concentration
of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interest, or un-
sound banking practices, "even if [these effects do] not reach the level of
an antitrust violation."35 The Board may36 also look at other adverse
ties even though it is presently an impermissible activity. Fed Proposes to Allow Banks It
Regulates to Invest in Real Estate Development, Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1985, at 20, col. 3.
The Board is taking such action because several states have passed legislation authorizing
their banking institutions to invest in real estate. Id.; see, eg., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6-
184(7) (Supp. 1984); Act of July 10, 1984, ch. 360, 1984 Cal. Legis. Serv. 437, 438 (West);
Act of July 10, 1984, ch. 360, § 109(16), 1984 N.Y. Laws 596, 642-43.
35. P. Heller, Handbook of Federal Bank Holding Company Law 263 (1976); see
Cyrnak, Convenience and Needs and Public Benefits in the Bank Holding Company Move-
ment, in The Bank Holding Company Movement to 1978: A Compendium 268-69 (Fed.
Res. Staff Study 1978). The specific statutory references to competition and undue con-
centration of resources reflect a "[c]ongressional concern over control of economic re-
sources that contemplated a more searching inquiry than the usual antitrust
considerations of ease of entry and relative market shares." Citicorp v. Board of Govs. of
the Fed. Res. Sys., 589 F.2d 1182, 1190-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979); see
Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 533 F.2d 224, 251
(5th Cir. 1976) ("Congress believed that concentration of economic resources in a single
entity beyond a certain point was harmful regardless of the proven existence of any an-
ticompetitive effects of such concentration."), modified on other grounds per curiam, 558
F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978); see also 1970 Conference
Report, supra note 30, at 17 ("It should be clear that the legislation directs the Board to
consider all reasonable ramifications of the concentration of resources in fulfilling its re-
sponsibilities under section 4."); S. Rep. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in
1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5519, 5532 ("[TIhe structural problem may be more
difficult to remedy [without a public benefits test] since in those cases there are no illegal
practices or conduct to be challenged in a court.") [hereinafter cited as 1970 Senate Re-
port]. But see County Nat'l Bancorp. v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 654 F.2d
1253, 1260 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (bank merger cannot be denied on basis of anticom-
petitive effects not constituting an antitrust violation); Mercantile Tex. Corp. v. Board of
Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 638 F.2d 1255, 1272 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); Washington
Mut. Sav. Bank v. FDIC, 482 F.2d 459, 465 (9th Cir. 1973) (same). The approach of
these courts substantially restricts the ability of the Board to reject bank mergers on anti-
competitive grounds, and thus compels agency approvals of bank combinations that are
not socially desirable. See Carstensen, Restricting the Power to Promote Competition in
Banking: A Foolish Consistency Among the Circuits, 1983 Duke LJ. 580, 580, 606-07.
The Board also favors de novo entry into nonbanking activities-the creation of a new
subsidiary to compete in an existing market-rather than entry by acquisition because de
novo entry generally promotes competition. See Imperial Bancorp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull.
784, 784 (1982); United Oklahoma Bancshares, Inc., 65 Fed. Res. Bull. 363, 364 (1979);
National Cent. Fin. Corp., 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 790,791 (1974); C. Golembe & D. Holland,
supra note 2, at 155; P. Heller, supra, at 267. The Board is specifically authorized by
section 4(c)(8) to consider the factor of de novo entry. See supra note 15. The statute,
however, does not permit the Board to approve automatically all de novo entries. See
Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 658 F.2d 571, 574-76
(8th Cir. 1981) (Board required to hold evidentiary hearing on the manner in which de
novo entry is to be effected); Florida Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Govs. of the Fed.
Res. Sys., 591 F.2d 334, 341 n.18 (5th Cir. 1979) (because Board "conclusorily" stated
that no undue concentration of resources would result from applicant's de novo entry
into insurance field, case was remanded for further introduction of evidence).
36. See Connecticut Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 627 F.2d
245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[A]lthough the Board's inquiry must proceed with rigor, we
cannot require it to investigate every potential adverse contingency which a contestant
hypothesizes.").
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factors, such as possible violations of state law37 and the existence of a
separate congressionally mandated regulatory structure.3 8
The Federal Reserve Board has held that an applicant bank holding
company must demonstrate net public benefits, even in the absence of
adverse effects. 9 This interpretation has been disputed, however, be-
cause it appears to run counter to the plain language of the statute. 40 If
adverse effects are possible, the applicant certainly must show that public
37. Compare Florida Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 591
F.2d 334, 341-42 (5th Cir. 1979) (Board failed to adequately consider state statutes that
prohibited banking institutions from engaging in insurance agency activities) with Ala-
bama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 533 F.2d 224, 252-53
(5th Cir. 1976) (Board reasonably assumed that bank holding company's application to
engage in certain insurance activities would comply with state law), modified on other
grounds per curiam, 558 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
38. See D.H. Baldwin Co., 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 280, 284-85 (1977) (savings and loan
regulators allow savings and loan associations to engage in a broader range of activities
than that permitted to bank holding companies; "[tihe conflict can be resolved only by
Congress"); see also Old Stone Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 593, 594-95 (1984) (following
logic of D.H. Baldwin). The existence of a separate congressionally mandated regulatory
structure may, however, be outweighed by other circumstances. See Citicorp, 69 Fed.
Res. Bull. 554, 554-56 (1983) (approving acquisition of failed savings and loan association
on condition that its activities be limited to those permissible under section 4(c)(8)); Pro-
file Bancshares, Inc., 61 Fed. Res. Bull. 901, 902 (1975) ("guaranty savings banks are
unique to New Hampshire and, of the six [such] banks operating in the State, three are
affiliated with a commercial banking institution"); Old Colony Co-Operative Bank, 58
Fed. Res. Bull. 417, 419 (1972) (approving acquisition of Rhode Island thrift institution
in view of the "history of affiliation of mutual thrift institutions and commercial banks in
Rhode Island"); Golembe Associates, Inc., Savings and Loan Associations and Bank
Holding Companies 35-42 (April 21, 1981) (discussion paper prepared for the use of the
Association of Bank Holding Companies) (arguing that the savings and loan activity
should be included among those permissible for bank holding companies) (available in
files of Fordham Law Review).
39. See, e.g., Trust Co. of Ga., 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 225, 226 (1983); National Detroit
Corp., 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 984, 985 (1978); National Cent. Fin. Corp., 60 Fed. Res. Bull.
790, 791 (1974). The requirement of net public benefits and the possibility that an appli-
cant could fail this prong of the test were contemplated by the Congress. See 1970 Senate
Report, supra note 35, at 14 (quoting the testimony of Richard W. McLaren, Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice); M. Jessee & S. Seelig,
supra note 18, at 30-31.
Activities determined to be permissible under section 4(c)(8) may be conducted
through a bank service corporation, as opposed to a bank holding company. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1864(f) (1982). As its name suggests, a bank service corporation provides certain serv-
ices to the banks that own it. Id. § 1861(b)(2). The Bank Service Corporation Act, id.
§§ 1861-1865, however, lacks an explicit net public benefits test, thus presenting a more
liberal standard than §4(c)(8). Data Processing Activities Put in BSC by Citcorp, 3 Bank-
ing Expansion Rep. 18, 18-19 (Nov. 19, 1984); see 12 U.S.C. § 1865(c) (1982) (listing
factors Board is authorized, not required, to consider; no requirement that factors benefi-
cial to public outweigh possible adverse effects).
40. See P. Heller, supra note 35, at 276 ("The statute does not require that there shall
be public benefits for every acquisition that receives approval."). The meaning of the
statute must be first sought in its language. 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Con-
struction § 46.01, at 73-74 (C. Sands rev. 4th ed. 1984). The language of section 4(c)(8)
requires that public benefits be demonstrated if a nonbank acquisition could have possible
adverse effects, but is silent as to whether public benefits need be demonstrated in the
absence of adverse effects. See supra note 15.
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benefits, such as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in
efficiency, will outweigh adverse effects.4"
B. Liberalization of the Original Section 4(c)(8)
The original section 4(c)(8)42 allowed bank holding companies to en-
gage in those activities of a "financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature"43
that were determined by the Board to be "closely related to the business
of banking."'  The Board took a very restrictive view of the phrase
"business of banking," declaring that the language requires a "direct and
significant connection between the proposed activities of the company to
be acquired and the business of banking. . . as conducted by the bank
holding company or its banking subsidiaries.4 -' The Board also limited
the geographic expansion of the nonbanking activities of bank holding
companies.46
41. P. Heller, supra note 35, at 262, 276-78. Included as public benefits under the
"convenience" and "efficiency" criteria are economies of scale (centralization of opera-
tions), J.P. Morgan & Co., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 514, 516 (1982); First Nat'l Holding Corp.,
60 Fed. Res. Bull. 603, 604 (1974), the more efficient pricing of services, The Citizens &
Southern Corp., 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 226, 226 (1974), the introduction of needed services
into a particular area, Marine Bancorp., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 504, 506 (1972), and the
furnishing of new and improved services, Northwest Bancorp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 519,
521 (1982). The public benefits test parallels the statutory standard applicable to bank
holding company acquisitions of banks by requiring the Board to weigh public benefit
factors against, inter alia, anticompetitive effects. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (1982).
42. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 511, § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat. 133, 137 (current
version at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982)).
In 1933, Congress, convinced that national banks had taken undue risks with deposi-
tors' funds, see S. Rep. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 6, 10 (1933), passed the Glass-
Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.), which prohibited a national bank from underwriting securities and severely re-
stricted bank investment in securities of nonbank enterprises, see 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh
(1982). Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 61 &
n.28 (1981); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629-34 (1971). Because the
Glass-Steagall Act applied mainly to national banks, see 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh (1982),
these institutions could circumvent the law's restrictions by forming a holding company
and conducting the nonbank activity indirectly through a separate subsidiary of the hold-
ing company. Savage, A History of the Bank Holding Company Movement, 1900-78, in
The Bank Holding Company Movement to 1978: A Compendium 36-38 (Fed. Res. Staff
Study 1978). This loophole, combined with the fear of concentration of banking re-
sources in a few institutions, led to passage of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.
See 1955 Senate Report, supra note 29, at 2; H.R. Rep. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5,
16 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 House Report].
43. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, Pub. L No. 84-511, § 4(c)(6), 70
Stat. 133, 137 (1956) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982)).
44. Id.
45. 1969 Hearings, supra note 4, at 199 (statement of William Martin, Jr., Chairman,
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System) (emphasis added). The Board required a
"direct functional integration" of the activities of a proposed nonbank subsidiary with
those of the applicant bank holding company; similarity was not enough. See General
Contract Corp., 44 Fed. Res. Bull. 260, 278-79 (1958).
46. See First Bank Stock Corp., 44 Fed. Res. Bull. 917, 926 (1959) (denying acquisi-
tion of finance company by bank holding company because bank holding company could
"acquire installment paper over much wider areas than would be feasible for nonholding
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Congress amended section 4(c)(8) in 1970.1 The words "business of"
in the phrase "closely related to the business of banking" were deleted,48
as was the phrase that referred to activities of a "financial, fiduciary, or
insurance nature."4 9 Congress decided to retain the words "closely re-
lated," despite proposals in both houses of Congress that a more lax
"functionally related" standard be employed.5" A "laundry list" of six
impermissible activities was also rejected in favor of the closely related
standard." In addition, the public benefits test was added, thus intro-
ducing antitrust considerations into section 4(c)(8) determinations.5 2
company banks"); Kohn & Zoellner, supra note 24, at 16 ("Dropping the clause 'the
business of' [banking] means that nonbank subsidiaries ... [would] be able to expand
into geographical ... markets separate from those served by their own banking
affiliates.").
47. See Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84
Stat. 1760 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
The restrictions of the Bank Holding Company Act did not apply to one-bank holding
companies-that is, those corporations controlling only one bank-because the Act de-
fined a bank holding company as a corporation controlling two or more banks. See Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 2(a), 70 Stat. 133, 133
(current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1982)). Thus, during the 1960's, the number
of one-bank holding companies rapidly increased. Chase I, supra note 24, at 1227 & n.5.
Many of these one-bank holding companies engaged in a wide range of nonfinancial activ-
ities. House Comm. on Banking & Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., The Growth of Un-
registered Bank Holding Companies-Problems and Prospects 50 (Comm. Print 1969)
(about half of all one-bank holding companies are involved in over 90 different nonfinan-
cial activities, such as farming, mining and manufacturing). The fear of large banking
institutions and the apparent abrogation of the traditional separation of banking from
commerce, see 1970 Conference Report, supra note 30, at 11-12; 1970 Senate Report,
supra note 35, at 3-4, led Congress in 1970 to extend the restrictions of the Act to one-
bank holding companies, see 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1982).
48. See 1970 Conference Report, supra note 30, at 15-16. This revision was intended
to allow bank holding companies to engage in nonbanking activities that were related to
banking generally but not directly connected with the activities of banks in a particular
geographic region. Id. at 16 (letter of Arthur Burns, Chairman, Board of Governors,
Federal Reserve System). See supra notes 45, 46 and accompanying text.
49. See 1970 Conference Report, supra note 30, at 15 ("Congress intended no great
significance be given to this deletion ... "); 1970 Senate Report, supra note 35, at 15
(phrase considered redundant).
50. See 1970 Conference Report, supra note 30, at 13-16, 19-22 (discussing the differ-
ences between the Senate and House bills and recommending a closely related standard);
1970 Senate Report, supra note 35, at 12 (recommending a functionally related standard);
H.R. Rep. No. 387, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3, 9 (1969) (favoring the more flexible func-
tionally related standard); 1969 Hearings, supra note 4, at 199 (statement of William
Martin, Jr., Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System) (" . . . Section
4(c)(8) should be amended to eliminate the reference to close relationship of the proposed
activity to the business of the subsidiary banks, which we regard as unnecessarily
constricting.").
51. 116 Cong. Rec. 42,429 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Sparkman); 116 Cong. Rec.
42,423 (1970) (letter from Rep. Wright Patman to Arthur Burns, Chairman, Board of
Governors, Federal Reserve System, Nov. 19, 1970). The following activities were in-
cluded on the laundry list: operating a travel agency, providing data processing services,
except as an incident to banking services, leasing property, providing auditing and ac-
counting services, selling mutual funds, and operating an insurance agency. See 115
Cong. Rec. 33,133-34 (1969).
52. See 1970 Conference Report, supra note 30, at 16-19.
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Congress did not promulgate a specific antitrust standard as it did in
section 3 of the Act53 but did want the Board to conduct a more thor-
ough examination of anticompetitive effects and concentration of re-
sources than that mandated under the existing antitrust laws.-
The House and Senate conferees disagreed on whether the amend-
ments rejected or adopted an expansive approach to section 4(c)(8). 55
The Supreme Court eventually declared that the amendments broadened
the Board's discretion as to permissible activities.56 Beyond this pro-
nouncement, the present section 4(c)(8) lacks the support of a clear, posi-
tive legislative history.
Since 1970, the public benefits component has undergone a distinct
liberalization. The Board originally limited section 4(c)(8) acquisitions
to small companies,57 but in recent years it has considered larger acquisi-
tions to be publicly beneficial and thus permissible.5" Hence, the Board
53. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (1982); Product Expansion, supra note 4, at 42-43.
54. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
55. The House managers of the bill saw the Conference Committee's decision to re-
tain the phrase "closely related" and to add the public benefits test as a rejection of any
expansive approach to section 4(c)(8). See 1970 Conference Report, supra note 30, at 21-
22; 116 Cong. Rec. 41,950-51 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Wright Patman). The Senate con-
ferees and a minority of the House conferees, on the other hand, believed that the revised
section would free the Board of its prior restrictive policy. See 116 Cong. Rec. 41,953-54
(1970) (remarks of Rep. Widnall); id. at 42,424 (remarks of Sen. Sparkman); Chase I,
supra note 24, at 1238-39. See supra notes 46, 48 and accompanying text. The House
managers considered insurance activities to be impermissible under the revised section,
see 116 Cong. Rec. 41,952-53 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Patman), while the Senate confer-
ees considered it to be permissible, see i. at 42,432, 42,435-36 (remarks of Sen. Bennett);
id. at 42,424 (remarks of Sen. Sparkman).
56. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 104 S. Ct.
3003, 3008 n.12 (1984). The Court thus resolved a conflict in the courts of appeals on
this issue. Compare Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res.
Sys., 533 F.2d 224, 239 (5th Cir. 1976) ("no significant change in the general range of the
Board's discretion was effected"), modified on other grounds per curiam, 558 F.2d 729
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978) with National Courier Ass'n v. Board of
Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 516 F.2d 1229, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("Congress intended to
expand that latitude in substantial degree.").
57. Compare Colonial Bancorp, 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 310, 311 (1974) (approving acqui-
sition of insurance financing agency with assets of $5.9 million) and Midwestern Finan-
cial Corp., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 848, 849 (1972) (approving acquisition of mortgage and
investment company with total servicing portfolio of approximately S20 million) and
First Chicago Corp., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 175, 175-76 (1972) (approving acquisition of
mortgage banking firm with total loan portfolio of S97.5 million) and Industrial Nat'l
Corp., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 171, 172 (1972) (approving acquisition of factoring company
with volume of $110 million) with Chase Manhattan Corp., 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 142, 143-
44 (1974) (denying acquisition of a major consumer finance company with total gross
receivables of almost $309 million on the basis of undue concentration of resources) and
U.S. Bancorp, 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 177, 178 (1972) (denying acquisition of mortgage bank-
ing firm with $205 million servicing portfolio) and BTNB Corp., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 70,71
(1972) (denying acquisition of mortgage banking firm with S632.6 million servicing
portfolio).
58. See Manufacturers Hanover Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 452, 452-53 (1984) (ap-
proving acquisition of CIT Financial Corp., "one of the largest diversified finance compa-
nies in the United States" with total assets of $6.2 billion); Fuji Bank, Ltd., 70 Fed. Res.
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has retreated from a harsher application of the searching antitrust in-
quiry that Congress intended in the public benefits test.59
As a result of intense lobbying efforts by the insurance industry,6° the
legislative and regulatory modifications of section 4(c)(8) were sharply
curtailed in 1982 by the passage of Title VI of the Garn-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act (Garn-St. Germain Act).6 1 This law pre-
cludes bank holding companies from engaging in certain insurance activ-
ities.62 Insurance holding companies, however, are free of many activity
restrictions63 and vigorously compete with bank holding companies.
64
Hence, Title VI is a step backward in promoting a competitive financial
services market.
Bull. 50, 50-52 (1984) (approving acquisition of Walter E. Heller Int'l Corp., a commer-
cial finance and banking firm with total assets of approximately $6.5 billion); Northwest
Bancorp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 519, 519-21 (1982) (approving acquisition of finance com-
pany with total assets of $979 million); Barclays Bank Ltd., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 980, 980-
82 (1980) (approving acquisition of finance company with total assets of $784 million).
59. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
60. See Friedman, Agents Seal Banks' Fate in Insurance With Intense Lobby Effort,
National Underwriter (Property and Casualty Ins. ed.), Oct. 22, 1982, at 2; Schweitzer &
Halbrook, Insurance Activities of Banks and Bank Holding Companies: A Survey of Cur-
rent Issues and Regulations, 29 Drake L. Rev. 743, 743-45 (1980).
61. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(A)-(G) (1982).
62. See supra note 15. Insurance activities are not closely related to banking unless
they fall into one of seven express exceptions: (1) credit insurance covering death, disabil-
ity or involuntary unemployment of a debtor; (2) credit property damage insurance on
loans of not more than $10,000 ($25,000 in the case of residential manufactured homes)
where the insurance was provided by a finance company subsidiary of a bank holding
company; (3) insurance agency activities in places with population not exceeding 5,000
or which the bank holding company demonstrates have inadequate insurance agency fa-
cilities; (4) insurance activities engaged in by a bank holding company or any of its sub-
sidiaries on or before May 1, 1982, or which the Board approved for such company or
any of its subsidiaries on or before May 1, 1982; (5) supervision, on behalf of insurance
underwriters, of retail insurance agents who sell fidelity, property and casualty, and
group employee coverages to a bank holding company or its subsidiaries; (6) any insur-
ance agency activity if the bank holding company has total assets of $50 million or less to
the extent allowed in (1), (2), and (3) above; and (7) continuance of insurance agency
activities of registered bank holding companies commenced prior to January 1, 1971 as a
consequence of approval by the Board. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(A)-(G) (1982).
63. Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 787,
807-09 (1979).
64. In a decade in which non-depository financial institutions increasingly are
engaging in de facto banking notwithstanding the Glass-Steagall Act, and in
which insurance/brokerage combinations such as Prudential/Bache and Sears
are positioning themselves to offer so-called "total financial planning," new re-
strictions on commercial bank and bank holding company activities only can
further hamstring their competitiveness and profitability. From both a compet-
itive and policy perspective, [Title VI of the Garn-St. Germain Act] is an
anachronism.
Gorinson & Manishin, supra note 12, at 1334; see K. Cooper & D. Fraser, supra note 2, at
198-203; see also 1984 Hearings, supra note 1, at 424-28 (testimony of Consumer Bankers
Ass'n) (insurance companies have expanded their range of financial services).
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C. Weaknesses of Section 4(c)(8)
Despite the significant liberalization discussed above, section 4(c)(8)
remains deficient. The National Courier guidelines highlight the inherent
weakness of the "closely related" test of that section: The applicant bank
holding company must, under the holding of National Courier, look to
past or present activities or functions to demonstrate a substantial link
between the proposed activity and banking operations.6" In reviewing
Board rulings under section 4(c)(8), courts will look at the "general prac-
tices" and "traditional functions" of banks.66 The Board thus pays care-
ful attention to such criteria.67 The result is unfortunate: A bank
holding company could be denied permission to engage in a financial ac-
tivity simply because the activity is outside the traditional realm of bank
operations.68
Another deficiency of section 4(c)(8) is in the public benefits test. This
test requires an applicant bank holding company to demonstrate that,
even in the absence of adverse effects, public benefits will result from the
conduct of the proposed activity.69 Savings and loan holding companies
and nondepository institutions, on the other hand, need not demonstrate
public benefits when they broaden their range of activities."" Moreover,
65. See, e.g., NCNB Corp. v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 599 F.2d 609, 613
(4th Cir. 1979) (upholding Board's determination that underwriting property and casu-
alty insurance failed to meet any of the three National Courier guidelines); Association of
Bank Travel Bureaus v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 568 F.2d 549, 552-53 (7th
Cir. 1978) (upholding Board's determination that, because the nature of travel services
had changed over time and less than one percent of all banks provided travel agency
services, operating a travel agency was not closely related to banking). See supra notes
16, 32 and accompanying text.
66. See Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 55-
56 (1981); Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 241 (5th Cir. 1976), modified on other grounds per curiam, 558 F.2d 729 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
67. See, e.g., Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 221, 223
(1983) ("a number of commercial banks. . . are currently engaged in providing the pro-
posed foreign exchange advice and transaction services to their customers"); J.P. Morgan
& Co., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 514, 515 (1982) (Morgan Guaranty has traded bullion in the
New York market since the mid-nineteenth century); Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 249,
250 (1982) ("[A] number of banks currently serve as dealers in bankers' acceptances and
certificates of deposit") (footnote omitted).
68. See, e.g., NCNB Corp. v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 599 F.2d 609, 610,
613-14 (4th Cir. 1979) (underwriting property and casualty insurance is not closely re-
lated to banking and thus not permissible); Seafirst Corp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 318, 319
(1982) (same with respect to underwriting group mortgage life insurance); BankAmerica
Corp., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 660, 661-62 (1980) (same with respect to underwriting home
loan life mortgage insurance).
69. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
70. See 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(c)(2) (1982) (activities of savings and loan holding compa-
nies; no public benefits test in statute); K. Cooper & D. Fraser, supra note 2, at 197
(nondepository institutions are largely free of activity constraints); Fein, The Fragmented
Depository Institutions System: A Case for Unification, 29 Am. U.L. Rev. 633, 693 (1980)
("Multiple S & L holding companies . . . are immune from the 'public benefits' test
applied to bank holding company activities."). Moreover, savings and loan associations
may organize service corporations, see 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(4)(B) (1982), to provide a
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"[n]o one has shown why, when financial intermediaries are involved, so-
called public benefits, such as making new services available in a town,
should weigh either more or less heavily in the balance against possible
anticompetitive effects than they do in ordinary antitrust reasoning."' 7'
Indeed, the Board is called upon to weigh a variety of factors without
any clear congressional guidance. 2
The public benefits test also contains unclear terms. The reference to
"undue concentration of resources" represents a nebulous fear of bank/
nonbank mergers-the belief that bigness is bad per se7 3-without articu-
lating the specific ways in which financial conglomeration threatens the
public well-being.74 "The joining of two large financial institutions by
merger may frighten legislators but still have no adverse competitive ef-
fects (indeed, may have pro-competitive consequences). . . ."" Indeed,
section 4(c)(8) applications have not been denied solely on the basis of
the undefined statutory reference to "undue concentration of resources;"
the elimination of present or potential competition was always an accom-
panying factor.76 Corporate bigness has also been feared for its pre-
sumed social and political dangers, such as undue influence on
government officials. 77  "[These] fears have a certain plausibility,
although intrinsically unmeasurable in fact and even conceptually indefi-
wide range of services determined by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to be "reason-
ably related to the activities of [savings and loan associations]," 12 C.F.R. § 545.74(c)
(1985). Such reasonably related activities include activities such as real estate manage-
ment, see 12 C.F.R. § 545.74(c)(3)(ii) (1985), and general insurance brokerage, see id.
§ 545.74(c)(5)(ii), in which bank holding companies are not allowed to engage, see supra
note 34. See Comment, Savings and Loan Associations, Securities Activities and the Glass-
SteagallAct, 20 Hous. L. Rev. 1383, 1416 (1983) (advocating a securities investment role
for savings and loan service corporations).
71. Clark, supra note 63, at 837.
72. See id. (describing public benefits factors as "nebulous"); see also 1970 Conference
Report, supra note 30, at 16-19 (describing only the negative elements of the public bene-
fits test and not specifying how the Board should balance the various factors); Product
Expansion, supra note 4, at 42-43 ("Section 4(c)(8) does not incorporate an antitrust
standard but leaves the public interest considerations largely to the Board's discretion";
undue concentration of resources factor is "indecipherable").
73. Product Expansion, supra note 4, at 8, 13-14.
74. Clark, supra note 63, at 849; see also Glassman & Eisenbeis, Bank Holding Com-
panies and Concentration of Banking and Financial Resources, in The Bank Holding
Company Movement to 1978: A Compendium 210-11 (Fed. Res. Staff Study 1978) (lack
of guidance in economic theory and empirical work and in legislative and judicial deliber-
ations as to what characterizes undue concentration of resources).
75. Product Expansion, supra note 4, at 8.
76. See, eg., Chase Manhattan Corp., 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 142, 144 (1974) (proposed
acquisition would eliminate potential competition); Crocker Nat'l Corp., 58 Fed. Res.
Bull. 419, 420 (1972) (proposed acquisition would eliminate existing competition); BTNB
Corp., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 70, 71 (1972) (proposed acquisition would eliminate potential
competition). This suggests that the Board is concerned with the danger of undue con-
centration of resources only to the extent that it threatens competition. See Industrial
Nat'l Corp., 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 314, 315-16 (1974) (approving acquisition of sixteenth
largest mortgage banking company by sixth largest mortgage banking company; each
served separate markets). See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
77. 5 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law I 1142c, at 244-47 (1980).
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nite."78 Finally, the entrance of financial and nonfinancial institutions
into the banking field has challenged the presumed "power" of commer-
cial banks.7 9 Thus, for all these reasons, the overwhelming fear of "undue
concentration of resources" should not warp section 4(c)(8) regulatory
policy. The deletion of this factor from section 4(c)(8) would not leave it
unconsidered in a nonbanking application. Rather, jurisdiction would be
returned to the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, which reg-
ularly deals with the problem of concentration of resources in all
industries. 80
Finally, as has already been discussed, the flexibility of section 4(c)(8)
has been vitiated by the Garn-St. Germain Act." Congress in 1970 had
specifically rejected the inclusion of a list of impermissible activities.' It
preferred to leave such determinations to the Federal Reserve Board,
which possesses the requisite expertise and awareness of the financial sys-
tem. 3 The Garn-St. Germain Act's prohibition against engaging in cer-
tain insurance activities precludes bank holding companies from a new
source of income. The restriction unfairly inhibits competition at a time
when insurance companies compete vigorously with banking institutions
in such fields as deposit-taking"4 and commercial mortgage lending. 5
The above analysis of the deficiencies of the present section 4(c)(8)
suggests that a revision of the Act is necessary in order to achieve a com-
petitive balance in the financial services industry.
II. REVISING SECTION 4(c)(8)
Historically, banks and their holding companies have been regulated
to promote their safety and soundness, 86 to avoid conflicts of interest,"
78. Id. 1142d, at 247.
79. Product Expansion, supra note 4, at 13.
80. Clark, supra note 63, at 837; see L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust
§ 204b, at 620 & n.27 (1977). The Board's jurisdiction to evaluate the competition factor
of section 4(c)(8) applications should be retained because the Board possesses expertise
with respect to the financial system, see Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. Agnew,
329 U.S. 441, 450 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring), and thus is in a strong position to
ensure against possible anticompetitive effects resulting from the activities of bank hold-
ing companies. The Board's jurisdiction under § 3 of the Act, see 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2)
(1982), to review bank holding company acquisitions of banks should be retained for the
same reason.
81. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
83. See Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 450 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., concurring); 116 Cong. Rec. 42,429 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Sparkman); id.
(remarks of Sen. Goodell).
84. K. Cooper & D. Fraser, supra note 2, at 5-9. See supra notes 1, 4, 64 and accom-
panying text.
85. K. Cooper & D. Fraser, supra note 2, at 200-01. See supra notes 1, 4; infra note
130 and accompanying text.
86. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 104 S. CL
3003, 3011 (1984) ("Congressional concern over the underwriting activities of bank afili-
ates included .. . the fear that bank funds would be lost in speculative investments
.... "); Transamerica Corp., 43 Fed. Res. Bull. 1014, 1016 (1957) (bank soundness was
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and to prevent the concentration of economic power and the resultant
potential for abuse and decreased competition.88 The policy of separat-
ing banking from commerce furthers these goals. This Part proposes
that the goals of bank regulation can be adequately achieved by a "rea-
sonably related to banking" standard combined with a finding that the
conduct of the proposed nonbanking activity does not result in decreased
competition in the financial services marketplace. Responsibility for de-
termining what constitutes "undue concentration of resources" should be
returned to the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. Unlike
the "closely related" standard, which focuses on traditional banking ac-
tivities,89 this new scheme focuses directly on whether the proposed ac-
tivity is consistent with historic bank policies and on the methods of
achieving such consistency. The proposed revision would allow bank
holding companies to diversify into new financial activities and to com-
pete more effectively with other providers of financial services.
A. Policy Guidelines
1. Bank Safety and Soundness
Risk results from the lack of perfect knowledge in decisionmaking. 90
Hence, banking, like other businesses, is not risk free. Traditional bank-
ing risks relate to the granting of credit; for example, borrowers may
default on their loans or the interest rates that are paid on deposits may
rise after a bank has lent out money at a fixed rate.91 The risks associated
with commercial ventures, on the other hand, relate to factors beyond
an original justification for the Bank Holding Company Act); Clark, supra note 63, at 795
(bank soundness is an objective of bank regulation); Symons, supra note 9, at 681 (promo-
tion of bank soundness is central to the concept of the business of banking); Product
Expansion, supra note 4, at 4 (bank soundness is a public policy objective). See infra Pt.
II.A. 1.
87. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630-31, 633-34 (1971) (Congress
thought that the desire to sell insurance might impair a bank's ability to function as an
impartial source of credit); Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res.
Sys., 736 F.2d 468, 475 (8th Cir. 1984) (desire to sell insurance could interfere with bank
officer's fiduciary obligation to customer); Transamerica Corp., 43 Fed. Res. Bull. 1014,
1016 (1957) ("The public interest requires that decisions as to whether or not a bank
extends credit in a particular case should be based, as far as possible, solely on
creditworthiness."); Symons, supra note 9, at 681 (neutrality in the allocation of credit is
a principle central to the concept of the business of banking). See infra Pt. II.A.2.
88. See Cameron Fin. Corp. v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 497 F.2d 841,
846 (4th Cir. 1974) (Congress in 1956 was concerned about the increasing concentration
of banking resources and the "combination in one enterprise of a major creditor in a
locality, a bank, and another service business[,] creat[ing] a condition ripe for exploitation
through tying relationships."); Clark, supra note 63, at 795 (the furtherance of general
antitrust policies is an objective of federal regulations concerning bank mergers and hold-
ing company acquisitions); Product Expansion, supra note 4, at 8-13 (guarding against
undue concentration of economic power is a public policy objective). See infra Pt. II.A.3.
89. See supra notes 65-68 & accompanying text.
90. Drum, Nonbanking Activities of Bank Holding Companies, Econ. Persps., March/
April 1977, 12, 16.
91. Kaufman, Mote & Rosenblum, The Future of Commercial Banks in the Financial
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mere credit errors, such as the risk that the market price of a parcel of
property will fall after its purchase.92 Nevertheless, bank holding com-
panies are exposed to a certain degree of this "market risk." For exam-
ple, bank holding companies are permitted to underwrite and deal in
government securities93 and, under the Edge Act,9 4 may underwrite for-
eign securities.'
Methods exist for limiting the risk of a proposed activity. The most
effective device would be a Board-imposed limitation on the percentage
of assets that a bank holding company could commit to all nonbank ac-
tivities, to a certain nonbank activity or to both.96 This would prevent a
bank holding company from committing too much of its resources to any
particular venture. Asset limitations could be combined with higher
minimum capital requirements for either the bank holding company or
its bank subsidiary.9 7 In addition, the holding company structure itself
Services Industry, in Financial Services: The Changing Institutions and Government Pol-
icy 94, 114-15 (G. Benston ed. 1983).
92. Symons, supra note 9, at 717.
93. See Citicorp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 249, 250 (1982).
94. 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-632 (1982).
95. See id. § 615(a). Underwriting involves the purchase of securities by a group of
securities firms for resale to dealers. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 82
(1983). Any underwriting operation entails market risk-"a change of conditions be-
tween the undertaking and when the actual issue occurs." Revenue Bond Underwriting
by Banks. A Panel Discussion, 2 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 53, 78 (1983) (remarks of Paul
Allan Schott, Acting Ass't Gen. Counsel, Dep't of the Treasury).
96. Asset limitations have been incorporated into federal and state banking law. See,
e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(4)(B) (1982) (three percent cap on investments in savings and
loan service corporations); id. §1843(c)(6) (five percent cap placed on bank holding com-
pany investment in the shares of any company); Can Fed-FDIC Real Estate Conflict Be
Avoided?, 4 Banking Expansion Rep. 3-4 (Feb. 4, 1985) (newly-granted real estate invest-
ment powers of state-chartered banking institutions have limitations ranging from five
percent of assets to one hundred percent of shareholders' equity).
In the securities field, putting aside Glass-Steagall problems, limitations might also be
set on the amount of capital that may be placed at risk in the underwriting of any one
issue of a particular security. Bank Underwriting, supra note 20, at 735. Bank holding
companies could also be permitted to underwrite only high quality issues, Bank Under-
writing, supra note 20, at 734; see also 12 C.F.R. § 337.4) (1985) (underwriting of invest-
ment quality debt or equity securities by securities subsidiaries of certain insured state
banks), such as high-grade municipal bonds and mortgage-backed securities, see S.2181,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(e)(3) (1984), reprinted in 1984 Hearings, supra note 1, at 22-
26.
The structure of the fee system used by bank holding company subsidiaries can also be
altered to limit risk. Fees paid to the realty advisory subsidiaries of bank holding compa-
nies were originally based on the income and asset size of the real estate investment trust
being advised. See A. Keeffe & M. Head, What is Wrong With the American Banking
System and What to Do About It, 36 Md. L. Rev. 788, 809 (1977). This tempted the
advisor to recommend a rapid growth strategy which focused more on profits than on
safety. Id. The Board no longer allows fees to be based on the profits derived from the
underlying activity. See BankAmerica Corp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 647, 649 (1982).
97. Capital includes, inter alia, common stock, perpetual preferred stock, surplus and
undivided profits. 12 C.F.R. § 225.43 app. A (1985). Capital requirements create a cush-
ion for creditors in case the institution fails. See K. Cooper & D. Fraser, supra note 2, at
180-81 & n.32; see also Drum, supra note 90, at 17 (evidence exists indicating under-
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can be used to facilitate the enforcement of regulations designed to pre-
vent fraud and other abuses:9" The activities of the nonbank business can
be confined to a separate subsidiary of the bank holding company. 9
capitalization of some bank holding companies and nonbank affiliates); Rose, The Effect
of the Bank Holding Company Movement on Bank Safety and Soundness, in The Bank
Holding Company Movement to 1978: A Compendium 137, 177 (Fed. Res. Staff Study
1978) (evidence indicates that bank holding companies have leveraged significantly in
recent years); H.R. 15, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. § 203(a) (1985) (bill requiring the Board to
consider the capital of the financial institutions involved in the section 4(c)(8) applica-
tion); S.2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104(d) (1984) (same).
98. The goal of bank safety and soundness and the desire for fair competition suggest
that nonbank subsidiaries be subjected to the same, if not greater, regulation against fraud
and other abuses than nonaffiliated companies in the same field. See Mutual Fund Un-
derwriting by Banks: A Panel Discussion, 2 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 81, 108-09 (remarks of
David Silver, President, Investment Co. Inst.); Bank Underwriting, supra note 20, at 731
& n.78. The investment activities of banks are currently exempt from major provisions of
the securities laws. Id.
99. Bank Underwriting, supra note 20, at 735-36. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation has promulgated rules for ensuring the separateness of a bank from a securi-
ties affiliate. 12 C.F.R. § 337.4(2) (1985). The following are listed as the characteristics
of separation:
[A] "[b]ona fide subsidiary" . (i) is adequately capitalized; (ii) is physically
separate and distinct in its operations from the operation of the bank; (iii) does
not share a common name or logo with the bank; (iv) maintains separate ac-
counting and other corporate records; (v) observes separate formalities such as
separate board of directors' meetings; (vi) maintains separate employees who
are compensated by the subsidiary; (vii) shares no common officers with the
bank; (viii) a majority of its board of directors is composed of persons who are
neither directors nor officers of the bank; and (ix) conducts business pursuant to
independent policies and procedures designed to inform customers and prospec-
tive customers of the subsidiary that the subsidiary is a separate organization
from the bank and that investments recommended, offered or sold by the sub-
sidiary are not bank deposits, are not insured by the [Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp.], and are not guaranteed by the bank nor are otherwise obligations of the
bank.
Id. at 46,723 (footnotes omitted). These rules try to enforce the separateness of subsidiar-
ies in the minds of the public, so that should the nonbank affiliate perform poorly, public
confidence in the bank will not be impaired. Product Expansion, supra note 4, at 19; see
also Chase & Mingo, The Regulation of Bank Holding Companies, 30 J. Fin. 281, 290
(1975) (arguing that banks are often "closely associated with their parent companies and
nonbank affiliates").
If a bank holding company respects the separate identity of its nonbank subsidiary, a
court would be unlikely to "pierce the corporate veil" and hold the parent company
responsible for the debts of the subsidiary upon the failure of the latter. See P. Heller,
supra note 35, at 163 & n. 17; Product Expansion, supra note 4, at 16-17; see also Chase,
The Bank Holding Company as a Device for Sheltering Banks from Risk, in Proceedings
of a Conference on Bank Structure and Competition 38, 45 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chicago
1971) ("under present law, requiring some or all 'expanded' activities of banks to be
performed by holding companies rather than by banks per se would tend to insulate [to a
certain extent] the resources of banks from risks entailed in expanded activities.") [here-
inafter cited as Chase II]. Although a bank holding company could avoid a legal obliga-
tion, it might accept a moral obligation to assume the debts of its failed subsidiary. P.
Heller, supra note 35, at 164; see Eisenbeis, supra note 34, at 147. In the 1970's, several
large bank holding companies sought to aid their poorly performing real estate invest-
ment trusts with bank loans, and thus protect the holding companies' reputations. A.
Keeffe & M. Head, supra note 96, at 808-11. "[T]he banks' efforts to save face in the [real
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Moreover, diversification of bank holding companies may reduce risk
to the overall organization by reducing dependence on one activity and
by stabilizing the flow of earnings. o If bank holding companies engage
in nonbanking businesses whose return on equity is inversely or weakly
correlated with that of banking, these nonbanking activities might be able
to pick up the slack and stabilize the earnings of the parent company
when the banking business sours.''
The public benefits component of section 4(c)(8) explicitly recognizes
the importance of risk limitation. 2 The "closely related" determination
also functions in part to guard against risk: If the proposed activity is
similar to current or past operations, the bank holding company presum-
ably possesses a certain amount of managerial and technical expertise.'0 3
Any revision of section 4(c)(8) that replaces the current standards should
thus allow the Board to examine, as part of its risk inquiry, the appli-
cant's managerial and technical resources."
Risk has thus far been discussed from the point of view of the public.
Bank holding companies, however, view the failure to deregulate as a
estate investment trust] market may cause the collapse of the entire banking system." Id.
at 811. Nevertheless, "externally imposed restrictions on the use of banking resources to
meet claims on affiliated corporations" could be imposed to buttress the subsidiary orga-
nizational form as a risk limiting mechanism. Chase II, supra, at 44.
100. See Edwards & Scott, supra note 20, at 93 ("there is actually good reason to think
that, as a diversification constraint, [activity restrictions] make banks more vulnerable to
insolvency."); Rose, supra note 97, at 159 (evidence exists that bank holding company
expansion into new activities may both reduce the overall risk exposure of the bank hold-
ing company organization and yield diversification benefits); Bank Underwriting, supra
note 20, at 720, 729 (diversification can help stabilize bank holding company revenues);
see also Heggestad, supra note 20, at 222-23 (same, but admits some uncertainty as to risk
prediction).
101. Heggestad, supra note 20, at 222-23; Bank Underwriting, supra note 20, at 729 &
n.61. It should be noted, however, that "[o]nce banking is combined with another activ-
ity under the same corporate umbrella," the inverse correlations may be affected. Drum,
supra note 90, at 17.
102. "Unsound banking practices" is specifically referred to as an adverse factor in the
public benefits test. See supra note 15. The Board may impose a business risk test under
the "unsound banking practice" factor. See BankAmerica Corp. v. Board of Govs. of the
Fed. Res. Sys., 491 F.2d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1974) (leasing arrangements that do not per-
mit a bank holding company to recover its full investment in the property to be leased
would subject bank holding company to greater risks than would otherwise be the case).
103. See Real Estate Experts Spot Trouble In Activities of Novice Developers, Wall St.
J., Dec. 19, 1984, at 31, col. 5 ("Allowing thrifts to develop property 'is like saying a
dermatologist would be a good neurosurgeon because they both have an M.D.' ") (quot-
ing Kenneth Nitzberg, President of Equitec Financial Corp., a California syndicator); see
also Thrift Units on Coast Surging, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1984, at D10, col. 4 ("Talent is
the major issue, it's not regulations .... ") (quoting Christopher Leinberger, President
of the Robert Charles Lesser Co., a consulting concern).
104. Cf BankAmerica Corp., 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 517, 518 (1974) ("General insurance
underwriting involves the management of risks qualitatively different from those encoun-
tered in ordinary banking and familiar to bank management."). The Board is not re-
quired under the language of section 4(c)(8) to consider the managerial resources of the
applicant. See supra note 15. Bills promulgating an overall revision of section 4(c)(8)
have specifically incorporated this factor into the statutory standard. See H.R. 15, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(a) (1985); S.2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104(d) (1984).
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major long term risk.10 5 Without deregulation, banks and their holding
companies are at a competitive disadvantage compared to other financial
institutions." 6 A revision of section 4(c)(8) would allow bank holding
companies to engage in a broader range of somewhat riskier business
activities. Nevertheless, definite methods of risk limitation do exist and
diversification itself can reduce the risk of dependence on one activity.
2. Conflicts of Interest
The structure of bank holding companies presents the danger of seri-
ous conflicts of interest that threaten bank soundness and skew the im-
partial allocation of credit in our economy."0 7 Banks might aid their
nonbank affiliates with loans, 108 grant credit to preferred customers of its
nonbank subsidiaries0 9 or deny credit to competitors of its nonbank affil-
iates." 0 Other problems include access to confidential information by
both bank and nonbank officials,"' pressures on the nonbank affiliate to
skew its business decisions in favor of the bank affiliate, '1 2 the granting of
105. See Beatty, What Are the Legal Limits to the Expansion of National Bank Serv-
ices?, 86 Banking L.J. 3, 31 (1969).
106. Id.
107. See Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S, 46, 66
n.38 (1981) (bank could be induced to make unsound loans to affiliate); Investment Co.
Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630-33 (1971) (same); Chase & Mingo, supra note 105, at
289 (bank affiliations with holding companies involve potential conflicts of interest which
can result in excessive management fees and improper loan participation arrangements);
Salley, 1970 Bank Holding Company Amendments: What Is "Closely Related to Bank-
ing?", Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta Monthly Rev. 98, 100 (1971) (conflicts of interest may
jeopardize bank stability and the efficient allocation of credit). For a thorough treatment
of the conflict of interest problem in financial institutions, see Schotland, Conflicts of
Interest Within the Financial Firm: Regulatory Implications, in Issues in Financial Regu-
lation 123, 123-54 (F. Edwards ed. 1979) and Peltzman, Commentary, in Issues in Finan-
cial Regulation 155, 155-61 (F. Edwards ed. 1979).
108. See Financial Institutions Restructuring and Services Act of 1981: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 674-77
(1981) (statement of the Investment Co. Inst.) (bank might grant credit to affiliated real
estate investment trust); Schotland, Bank Holding Companies and Public Policy Today, in
House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, Financial Institutions and the Na-
tion's Economy: Compendium of Papers Prepared for the FINE Study 233, 270-73, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (discussing conflicts of interest which occurred between banks and
affiliated real estate investment trusts during the 1970's); see also 1970 Senate Report,
supra note 35, at 3 (bank holding company may misuse bank resources by making loans
to nonbank affiliates); 1955 House Report, supra note 42, at 16 (same).
109. Transamerica Corp., 43 Fed. Res. Bull. 1014, 1016 (1957); Bank Underwriting,
supra note 20, at 737; see 1955 House Report, supra note 42, at 16.
110. Transamerica Corp., 43 Fed. Res. Bull. 1014, 1016 (1957); 1970 Senate Report,
supra note 35, at 3; 1955 House Report, supra note 42, at 16.
111. Confidential credit information maintained by the commercial loan department of
a bank could be useful in the investment banking activities of the bank's affiliates. Bank
Underwriting, supra note 20, at 729. Confidential information can also flow from the
nonbank subsidiary to the bank affiliate. See Security Pac. Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 118,
121 (1985) (denying acquisition by bank holding company of credit rating portion of
investment advisory business because agency could release confidential information ob-
tained during the credit rating process to its affiliated bank).
112. See Security Pac. Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 118, 121 (1985) (bank holding com-
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excessive bank dividends to finance nonbank growth, I" and self-dealing,
which occurs when a party to a transaction has "power to influence the
decisions of both bargaining entities but a greater interest in how well
one of them fares."114 The Board has prohibited bank holding compa-
nies from engaging in certain activities, such as credit rating and general
management consulting, because conflicts of interest could result."15
The possibility of conflicts of interest, like bank risk, can be mini-
mized." 6 Legislation exists permitting regulation of transactions among
affiliates. Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act,I" for example, limits
loans to any single affiliate to ten percent of a bank's equity capital' 18 and
requires loan collateral in excess of one hundred percent of the dollar
amount of the loan in certain circumstances 1 9 One could also simply
prohibit all transactions among subsidiaries of a bank holding company,
with limited exceptions." ° This would effectively prevent self-dealing.
The granting of excessive dividends, which drains capital from the bank
subsidiary, could be discouraged by varying the premiums of deposit in-
surance funds to reflect any increased riskiness"2 ' or by higher capital
pany might pressure credit rating agency to adjust favorably its ratings of certain bank
borrowers); First Commerce Corp., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 674, 675 (1972) (bank holding
company might pressure management consulting agency to advise client to repay a loan
although not in the best interest of client). Another important pressure is the promo-
tional interest in selling a particular nonbank product, which may conflict with a banker's
objectivity or fiduciary obligations to his client. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401
U.S. 617, 633 (1971) (securities activities); Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Govs. of
the Fed. Res. Sys., 736 F.2d 468, 475 (8th Cir. 1984) (insurance); Independent Ins.
Agents v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 658 F.2d 571, 574 (8th Cir. 1981) (same).
113. Clark, supra note 63, at 829-30. Such a practice "leave[s] the intermediary more
highly leveraged [with less capital] and thus more risky and less able to support new
business." Id. at 830.
114. Id at 841. A typical situation would be where one subsidiary purchases services
or property at inflated prices from other affiliates in the same bank holding company. Id.
at 829.
115. See, eg., Security Pac. Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 118, 121 (1985) (denying acquisi-
tion by bank holding company of credit rating portion of investment advisory business);
First Commerce Corp., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 674, 676 (1972) (denying acquistion by bank
holding company of general management consulting firm).
116. See infra notes 117, 118 and accompanying text. In the securities field, where
banks may sponsor closed-end investment companies, 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(4)(ii) (1985),
section 17(b) of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(b) (1982), requires
that transactions between such companies and other subsidiaries of the company's ad-
viser be fair to all parties involved. The Board has also relied on conflict of interest
regulations promulgated by other agencies. See Citicorp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 776, 778
(1982) (rules promulgated by Commodity Futures Trading Commission substantially re-
duce the possibility for significant conflicts of interest).
117. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1982).
118. See id. § 371c(a)(1)(A).
119. See id. § 371c(c)(1)(B)-(D).
120. Clark, supra note 63, at 842-43, 862-63. An exception would be allowed for divi-
dends and capital contributions and where a nonbank affiliate could "clearly demonstrate
that the proposed transaction would generate a significant 'self-dealing surplus'-it would
be better than a fair, or open-market, transaction-and that the [affiliate] will share sig-
nificantly in it." Id. at 862-63.
121. Clark, supra note 63, at 847.
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requirements. 122
The problems of access to confidential information and the granting of
credit to preferred customers can be prevented by erecting a "Chinese
Wall"-formal written internal procedures designed to sever the flow of
sensitive information among the various affiliates of a holding com-
pany. 23 A bank holding company is uniquely suited to establishing this
barrier because nonbank subsidiaries are physically separate from bank
subsidiaries 124 and can be treated as distinct companies. 125 Investment
banking firms and bank trust departments both have successfully utilized
the Chinese Wall. 12
6
The possibility that credit will be denied to competitors has been over-
emphasized. Banks do make loans to firms, such as finance companies,
with which they presently compete. 1 27 Moreover, in today's competitive
environment, 128 banks may not be inclined to turn away customers.
Banks, after all, are not the sole providers of credit in our economy. 29
It is apparent from the above discussion that a liberalized section
4(c)(8) must consider the important policy of avoidance of conflicts of
interest. Methods such as the Chinese Wall and the limitations on trans-
actions between affiliates can be employed to prevent the conflicts of in-
terest that might otherwise arise.
3. Antitrust Considerations
The fear of banking power has been ingrained into the American
122. See K. Cooper & D. Fraser, supra note 2, at 180-81, 184 n.32; Edwards & Scott,
supra note 20, at 93. This approach may be somewhat costly, however, because "a truly
dramatic increase in net worth over past and present levels [may be needed] before there
is a significant impact on an [affiliate's] probability of failure." Clark, supra note 63, at
846.
123. Herzel & Coiling, The Chinese Wall Revisited, 6 Corp. L. Rev. 116, 119 (1983).
A Chinese Wall can prevent a bank subsidiary from asking for the names of, or other
material information about, customers of the nonbank affiliate. Id. In addition, if bank
holding companies were allowed to engage in a broader range of securities activities, bank
examiners could be required to "compare [a] securities affiliate's buy-and-sell lists and
records regarding underwriting customers with the bank's classified loans." Bank Under-
writing, supra note 20, at 737.
124. See Bank Underwriting, supra note 20, at 736. See supra note 99 and accompany-
ing text. But see Security Pac. Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 118, 121 (1985) ("[Tlhe Board
believes that the conflicts in the relationship between a major lender and a credit rating
company are so pervasive they cannot be overcome through the adoption of a 'Chinese
wall'.").
125. See supra note 99.
126. Herzel & Coiling, supra note 123, at 130.
127. See P. Teplitz, Trends Affecting the U.S. Banking System 67, 86-87 (1976) (tables
indicating the sources of funds of other financial institutions); Standard & Poor's Indus-
try Surveys B20 (1985) (table indicating that banks loan money to other financial
institutions).
128. See K. Cooper & D. Fraser, supra note 2, at 198-203.
129. Product Expansion, supra note 4, at 7; see also K. Cooper & D. Fraser, supra note
2, at 9 (table illustrating the financial services offered by depository and nondepository
institutions). Other suppliers include the commercial paper market, commercial finance
companies, and insurance companies. Product Expansion, supra note 4, at 7.
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psyche.1 3 Banks have been seen as possessing certain advantages over
other businesses-for example, access to low cost funds,13 the ability to
deduct the interest cost of holding municipal bonds, 3 and the potential
to "tie" the sale of a bank service to the sale of a nonbank service.' 33 In a
business climate characterized by heavy competition, these special attrib-
utes may not be as valuable to banks as was once believed.'" But while
the value of these advantages has eroded, the formal barrier of section
4(c)(8) has continued to hamper competition between bank holding com-
panies and other financial service providers.
The need to promote competition in the banking industry was recog-
nized by Congress in the Bank Merger Acts of 1960 13 and 1966,136
which extended antitrust concerns to the merger of banks.' 37 The Bank
130. See C. Golembe & D. Holland, supra note 2, at 4-5. The Jeffersonians were suspi-
cious of the business of banking, viewing it as a corrupting, evil influence in the new
nation. Id at 4; Product Expansion, supra note 4, at 8.
131. Certain depository institutions are permitted access to the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem's discount window, see 12 U.S.C. §§ 347, 347a, 347b (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 201
(1985) -that is, they may borrow money at a favorable rate. See E. Bowden & J. Hol-
bert, supra note 1, at 50.
132. See 26 U.S.C. § 265(2) (1982).
133. The tying of bank to nonbank products is prohibited by the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1982). The Board has promulgated regulations pursu-
ant to this section. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(d) (1985). Tie-ins may be either coercive--for
example, where the bank requires the customer to purchase a particular nonbank ser-
vice--or voluntary-for example, when a prospective borrower purchases a nonbank ser-
vice in the belief that it would be helpful or necessary in obtaining a loan. See
Connecticut Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 627 F.2d 245, 256-57
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys.,
533 F.2d 224, 249-51 (5th Cir. 1976), modified on other grounds per curiam, 558 F.2d 729
(5th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978). The former are illegal under § 1972;
the latter may be considered a negative factor under the public benefits test of section
4(c)(8). Schweitzer & Halbrook, supra note 60, at 752-53; 1970 Conference Report, supra
note 30, at 18-19. However, "[voluntary tie-ins would be presumed to have a neutral
impact on section 4(c)(8) applications, except where the applicant has considerable mar-
ket power (as measured by concentration or some other measure.. .) at the location of
the proposed activity." Schweitzer & Halbrook, supra note 60, at 755.
134. See Product Expansion, supra note 4, at 9-11.
135. See Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)
(1982)).
136. See Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)
(1982)).
137. The Bank Merger Act of 1960 requires bank regulators to take into account com-
petitive effects in the approval of bank mergers. See 12 U.S.C. §1828(c)(4) (1982); see
also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 335-42, 352 (1963) (bank
mergers held subject to § 7 of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982), and
were not immune due to approval of merger by bank regulators). The Bank Merger Act
of 1966 required bank regulators to disapprove mergers that violated § 7 of the Clayton
Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982) (governing mergers and the acquisition of shares),
unless "the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in
the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience
and needs of the community to be served." 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (1982). Bank regu-
latory decisions applying more stringent standards than § 7 have been reversed. See
supra note 35.
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Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970138 further extended anti-
trust considerations by applying the public benefits test to the affiliation
of banks and nonbanks.1 39 Although deficient in certain respects, the
public benefits test has merit because it recognizes the desirability of
competition. Indeed, the most potent argument that can be advanced in
favor of expanded investment powers is that such powers would enhance
competition between bank holding companies and nonbank financial in-
stitutions.140 It would be rather anomalous, therefore, for section 4(c)(8)
to be devoid of any competitive standard.
The desire to promote competition in the financial services industry
justifies a regulatory approach requiring an applicant bank holding com-
pany to demonstrate that its conduct of a proposed activity will not re-
sult in decreased or unfair competition in the financial services
marketplace. Such an approach would reduce the need for any reference
to "undue concentration of resources," because an increase in concentra-
tion often results in a decrease in either present or potential
competition. 141
B. A "'Reasonably Related" Test
One alternative for a revised section 4(c)(8) consistent with the major
bank policies analyzed above might be formulated as follows:
Bank holding companies may engage in those activities determined by
the Board to be reasonably related to banking provided the Board finds
that the conduct of such activities would be unlikely to result in de-
creased or unfair competition. In determining what is reasonably re-
lated to banking, the Board shall consider whether the proposed
138. Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982)).
139. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982). See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
140. See K. Cooper & D. Fraser, supra note 2, at 197 (nondepository institutions are
largely free of activity restraints while depository institutions are not); Edwards & Scott,
supra note 20, at 93 (activity restrictions diminish competition in financial markets);
Product Expansion, supra note 4, at 50 (unlike other financial organizations, bank hold-
ing companies are compelled to "pick their way through the statutory and administrative
land-mines set out by Section 4(c)(8)", while competing financial organizations are free
from this restriction); see also 1984 Hearings, supra note 1, at 422-23 (testimony of the
Consumer Bankers Ass'n) (banks eager to offer full range of mutual fund and other
services).
141. See Chase Manhattan Corp., 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 142, 144 (1974) (bank holding
company's acquisition of nonbank firm would cause increase in concentration of re-
sources and elimination of potential competition); U.S. Bancorp, 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 177,
178 (1972) (bank holding company's acquisition of nonbank firm would cause increase in
concentration of resources and elimination of potential competition); BTNB Corp., 58
Fed. Res. Bull. 70, 71 (1972) (same). "[I]n the absence of market effects, there are no
obvious or accepted reference points for judging asset concentration mergers. To deal
with them, one must be prepared to formulate a host of specific and entirely arbitrary
rules that are not grounded in theoretical or empirical understanding, either economic or,
for that matter, political." 5 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 77, 1143f, at 253
(1980); see also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977)
("[A]n antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any objective
benchmarks.").
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activity (1) is financial in nature, (2) presents a substantial risk of loss
of assets to the bank holding company or any of its subsidiaries, and
(3) may result in serious conflicts of interest. The Board may in its
discretion impose asset limitations or other control devices to achieve
the goals of this section.
Under this scheme, the applicant bank holding company is freed from
the burden of trying to pigeonhole a proposed activity into some bank
function or operation. The focus is shifted to the activity itself to see if it
presents conflicts of interest or substantial risk to bank assets. The meth-
ods described earlier may be utilized under the new test to ensure bank
soundness and limit the potential for conflicts of interest.1 42 The limita-
tion to financial activities143 is desirable because it defers to the public
policy objective of limiting bank power,144 and it is in the financial area
that bank holding companies would be able to provide the greatest public
benefits. 4 5 Thus, bank holding companies will truly be viewed as finan-
cial institutions in a broad sense of the term and not merely as banks
hiding under a shell. 1"
The new analysis retains flexibility by discarding the specific activity
limits of Title VI of the Garn-St. Germain Act, 41 which were imposed as
a result of lobbying by the insurance industry. 148 Likewise, certain activ-
ities that have been determined by the Board to have failed the "closely
related" test, such as home loan and group mortgage life insurance un-
derwriting, 4 9 could now be added to the list of permissible activities.
Competitive concerns are retained because, as has already been dis-
142. See supra Pts. II.A. 1 & 2.
143. Attempts have been and are being made to incorporate a financial activity stan-
dard of one variety or another into section 4(c)(8). See H.R. 15, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 203(a) (1985) (permitting activities of a financial nature designed to enable bank hold-
ing companies to adjust to technological innovations in the provision of banking services
or which are substantially identical to products or services offered by nonbanking con-
cerns that are competitive with bank services); S.1609, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1983)
(permitting activities of a financial nature, including insurance underwriting and broker-
age, real estate development and brokerage, and certain securities activities), reprinted in
Moratorium Legislation and Financial Institutions Deregulation: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 9 (1983).
144. Product Expansion, supra note 4, at 28. See supra Pt. II.A.3. The limitation to
financial activities, combined with the requirement of increased competition, would pre-
vent the growth in this country of zaibatsu, the huge banking/commercial concerns of
Japan that monopolistically control certain aspects of Japan's economy. Note, Regulat-
ing the One-Bank Holding Companies--Precluding Zaibatsu?, 46 St. John's L Rev. 320,
320-21 (1971). Mitsubishi, the largest zaibatsu in 1970, was equivalent in size to a combi-
nation of Sears & Roebuck, American Export Lines, First National City Bank, and Pru-
dential Life Insurance Company. Ia at 321.
145. Product Expansion, supra note 4, at 29 ("These are, after all, activities with which
bankers are most familiar and the ones for which they should possess the greatest com-
parative advantage.").
146. See Product Expansion, supra note 4, at 43.
147. See supra notes 15, 62 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
149. See Seafirst Corp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 318, 319 (1982); BankAmerica Corp., 66
Fed. Res. Bull. 660, 661 (1980).
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cussed, the new banking climate is characterized by competition) 50 The
proposed elimination of most of the public benefits test might seem to be
too liberal a standard, but it actually presents a stricter test for bank
holding companies: The proposed section 4(c)(8) will not tolerate an-
ticompetitive effects, while the present standard dilutes competitive con-
cerns with other factors.151 Hence, the proposed scheme is better
tailored to address the major concern of bank expansion today:
competition.
In order to retain flexibility in the application of the statute and to
defer to the expertise of the Board, the proposed statutory language does
not define the phrase "financial activity." Activities furthering a bank's
historic role as a credit provider and deposit taker would certainly qual-
ify' 52 Fiduciary and insurance activities included in the original section
4(c)(8) language' 53 would also be within the intended scope of financial
activities.' 54 Any activity involving a financial agency or intermediary
relationship,'55 such as securities and insurance underwriting,156 could
qualify as a financial activity.'57 Ultimately, the Board will determine
the meaning of the phrase. In 1857, the New York Court of Appeals
dealt with a similar problem and one judge aptly stated that "[n]o human
sagacity can foresee what implied powers may, in the progress of time,
[and] the discovery and perfection of better methods of business,. . . be
required to give effect to the express powers. They are, therefore, left to
implication."'5 8
150. See supra notes 1, 4, 8 and accompanying text. The "decreased competition"
factor employed here would allow the Board to continue to evaluate anticompetitive ef-
fects, "even if [they] do not reach the level of an antitrust violation." P. Heller, supra
note 35, at 263. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
The reference to "unfair competition" would specifically authorize the Board to con-
tinue to examine tie-ins lacking any explicit coercive intent, see supra note 134, and to
evaluate claims that the "little guy" would be forced out of business by bank holding
company entrance into a particular nonbank field. See Bank Holding Company Act
Amendments of 1970, Hearings Before the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem: Extent to Which Property Management Is Closely Related to Banking 15, 18 (Jan. 26,
1972) (statement of Carl F. Hertz, President, Iowa Chapter, National Institute of Farm
and Land Brokers) (independent farm managers cannot compete with banks). The Board
would also be permitted to continue to consider other unfair competitive practices. See
1970 Conference Report, supra note 30, at 18-19 (describing the types of unfair competi-
tive practices).
151. Clark, supra note 63, at 836-37.
152. Symons, supra note 9, at 680-82, 724-25.
153. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
154. Product Expansion, supra note 4, at 30.
155. See H. Hutchinson, supra note 10, at 24-26; Symons, supra note 9, at 724-25.
156. See Symons, supra note 9, at 724-25.
157. Cf Product Expansion, supra note 4, at 47-48 ("insurance activities in all of its
forms [and] investment banking activities in all of its forms" are financial activities). The
proposed scheme, however, would still be subject to the Glass-Steagall Act's prohibition
on affiliations between banks and securities firms, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982), until such pro-
hibition is modified or removed.
158. Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 2, 157 (1857) (Brown, J., concurring).
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CONCLUSION
Confronted with competitive pressures resulting from changing eco-
nomic and technological conditions, bank holding companies must deal
with a regulatory system out of touch with these modem trends. Despite
significant liberalization, section 4(c)(8) still focuses on the traditional
operations of banks in determining what they may do in the future, and it
lists factors that are unclear. A "reasonably related" analysis focusing
on the traditional regulatory policies of bank safety and soundness and
avoidance of conflicts of interest, combined with the proposed competi-
tive criterion, would eliminate the rigidity of the present section 4(c)(8)
while maintaining control over the expansion of bank holding companies.
It would allow bank holding companies to meet competitive challenges
and to diversify, thus remaining important economic institutions in our
society.
Ralph P. DeSanto

